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In the past decade the Australian Federal government and state governments have established 
a wide range of programs to cut greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors. This paper 
examines the role of hot water system rebate programs in shifting the existing stock of 
electric water heaters toward more climate friendly versions using two unique data sets from 
New South Wales homeowners. The first data set is based on a survey of households who 
recently purchased a water heater and exploits a natural experiment created by the rebate 
program to quantify its effects. The other data set is based on a set of stated preference 
questions asked of households who own an older water heater and will in the reasonably near 
future face a replacement decision. We find that recent rebate programs significantly 
increased the share of solar/heat pump systems. For households without access to natural gas, 
this increased share comes directly from inefficient electric water heaters. For households 
with access to natural gas, older existing electric water heaters would likely have been 
replaced with gas water heaters in the absence of the rebate programs. The rebate program 
appears to be much less effective when water heaters are replaced on an emergency basis. 
Data from discrete choice experiments was analysed using several flexible choice models. A 
newly proposed model that combines a latent class approach with a random coefficients 
approach clearly dominates the other models in terms of statistical fit. Predictions based on 
this model estimate are reasonably consistent with actual purchase data. Results from it point 
to considerable heterogeneity with respect to household preferences toward different types of 
water heaters and with respect to the discount rates they hold.  
 
Keywords: Climate change mitigation, Energy conservation programs, Natural experiments,                    
Discrete choice experiments
                                                 
 The authors would like to acknowledge support from Australian Research Council grant DP 0774142. Jordan 
Louviere provided helpful advice on the experimental design, Yen-Ching Sung provided assistance on initial 
survey development work, and Edward Wei provided invaluable assistance in collecting the data. 
† Centre for the Study of Choice, University of Technology Sydney and Thailand Development Research 
Institute; Corresponding author; e-mail: nada.wasi@gmail.com 
‡ Department of Economics, University of California San Diego and  Centre for the Study of Choice, University 
of Technology Sydney   2
I. Introduction 
  In 2005, Australia’s per capita greenhouse gas emissions were among the highest in 
the world and the highest in the OECD. These high emissions are mainly driven by the high 
emissions intensity of energy use, resulting from Australia’s reliance on coal for electricity 
(Garnaut, 2009.) To promote energy efficiency improvement, the Australian Federal and state 
governments have established a wide range of programs for all sectors. This paper focuses on 
hot water system rebate programs aimed to reduce emissions from the New South Wales’ 
(NSW) residential sector. 
Water heating is the largest single source of greenhouse gas emissions from the 
average Australian home.
1 For NSW, which includes the greater Sydney metropolitan area, 
electric water heaters currently account for more than a third of household energy use.
2 
Switching one electric water heater to a climate-friendly water heater such as gas, solar or 
heat pump can reduce carbon emission by 2.5-3.0 tonnes per year on average. This implies a 
significant reduction at an aggregate level. While the share of gas water heaters has risen in 
the past three decades, shares of solar and heat pump systems remained relatively small (less 
than 5 percent in 2005) despite the fact that households could save on their energy bill by 
installing a solar or heat pump system. The high upfront cost of these systems is likely to be 
the key barrier. Some households may face financial constraints and those with high discount 
rates are unlikely to invest in a water heater that takes a long period to pay itself back.  
To overcome this barrier, the Federal government and NSW initiated rebate programs 
in July 2007 and October 2007, respectively. These two programs, which can be combined 
together, would allow a household that replaces an existing electric water heater with a solar 
or heat pump system to cover a large part of upfront cost. The NSW program also provides a 
rebate for those who switch from electric to gas. In this paper, we assess the effect of these 
recent efforts on household water heater demand of NSW homeowners using a survey 
explicitly designed to collect information from owners who purchased a water heater in the 
past six years and from NSW homeowners with older water heaters who are likely to 
purchase a water heater in the future. The six year time frame for the first set of households 
allows us to exploit a natural experiment created by the rebate programs to quantify their 
effects. The stated preference questions asked the other set of households allow us to examine 
the likely effects on possible changes in the rebate programs on future demand.  
                                                 
1 http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/programs-and-rebates/solar-hot-water.aspx 
2 http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/rebates   3
Using the actual purchase data, our results indicated that the rebate program 
significantly increased the share of solar/heat pump systems by 43 percent for households 
who do not have access to natural gas. This implies a similar reduction in the share of electric 
water heaters. For those with natural gas access, the program increased the share of solar/heat 
pump systems by 19 percent. For this group of households, however, most would have 
chosen to replace their electric water heaters with gas water heaters if the rebate programs 
had not been in place. Gas water heaters are more climate friendly than electric due to the 
heavy use of coal to generate electricity but are not as efficient as solar or heat pumps.
3 Thus, 
the rebate program for those with gas access should be seen as moving households away from 
choosing gas toward solar/heat pumps rather than from their current electric water heaters 
toward solar/heat pumps. We also find that the rebate programs appear to work largely on 
households that deliberately set out to replace their water heater rather than on households 
that replaced their water heater on an emergency/urgent basis. This suggests that programs 
that educate or provided incentives for plumbers, who play a large role in the emergency 
situations, may be an important channel to help improve the effectiveness of future rebate 
offerings.  
The data from the discrete choice experiments using the stated preference data were 
analysed using several flexible choice models, including the workhorse conditional 
multinomial logit model, two currently popular generalizations – latent class model and 
mixed logit model – as well as two relatively new models – generalized multinomial logit 
model,  and the mixture-of-normals mixed logit model which further generalize these models. 
The model using mixture-of-normals as the mixing distribution is found to dominate other 
models. Predictions are reasonably consistent with actual purchase data. The results from the 
discrete choice experiments point to considerable respondent heterogeneity in their 
perceptions toward different types of water heaters and in their implied discount rates with 
respect to payback periods. The estimated median discount rate is in the range of 10-12 
percent. Alternative scenarios are considered where the rebate amounts are lower than the 
2007 scheme and where households replacing an existing gas system with a solar or heat 
pump system are eligible for a rebate.    
The next two sections review the previous studies in this area and discuss the nature 
of the NSW water heater market. Section IV describes data collection. Results from actual 
purchase data and stated choice experiments are reported in Sections V and VI, respectively. 
                                                 
3 Solar and heat pump heaters are considered more efficient as they mainly generate energy from a “free 
source.”  Solar water heaters with gas booster are also more climate friendly than gas water heaters.   4
Section VII discusses predictions for different scenarios. The last section provides some 
concluding remarks.   
 
 II. Previous studies 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between household choice of 
appliance holdings, energy consumption, appliances' initial and operating costs, and fuel 
prices. Household reaction to a shift in relative fuel prices is traditionally considered as 
consisting of two components. First, in the short-run, consumers adjust their usage level 
holding the capital stock of appliances fixed.  In the long-run, consumers may trade off 
higher initial capital costs with the reduction in operating cost if the operating cost of their 
current system has significantly increased. 
Hausman (1979) jointly model these two decisions by looking at household demand 
for and use of home air-conditioners where each system differs in their efficiency level. 
Using a sample from 16 cities in the US in 1975, his estimates of the trade-off rate between 
initial cost and operating cost implies the discount rate about 20 percent.
4 In other words, an 
average consumer would be willing to pay about $4 for a dollar saved annually. Dubin and 
McFadden (1984) consider household demand for and use of space-water heating systems 
where they consider households whom water and space heaters were either both electric or 
both gas. They also find a discount rate about 20 percent calculated at the sample mean 
income for US households in 1975.
5   
Dubin (1986) is the only study that examines the choice of space and water heaters for 
new houses. All possible combinations of types of space and water heaters are used in the 
analysis. He employed a nested logit model where the upper-level nest is the choice of space 
heating. Then, conditional on the type of space heating, the consumers choose among three 
types of water heaters: electric, gas and oil. Using the Pacific Northwest region, he finds a 
relatively low discount rate (9.6 percent) for water heaters compared to the previous two 
studies, both of which used national data. There are some studies (e.g., Cameron, 1985 and 
Hartman, 1988) that look at household demand for retrofits such as wall insulation, storm 
                                                 
4 Hausman (1979) estimates a two-stage model. In the first stage, conditional on each possible air conditioner, 
an individual chooses usage level (electricity demand). Empirically, he finds that consumers with a higher 
efficient system also use air conditioning more. In the second stage, individuals choose the optimal choice 
among different types of air conditioners where the estimated usage level from the first stage is used in 
calculating operating cost. 
5 Dubin and McFadden (1984) first predict the probability of choosing a gas or electric system. The running cost 
in the first stage is calculated based on typical usage. In the second stage, the predicted probability is then used 
as an instrument in the electricity demand equation.     5
windows and hot water pipe wrap. Such decisions should be considered medium-run 
adjustments. While waiting for a long-run adjustment in a household’s major appliance 
holdings, some consumers may find it optimal to make investments to improve energy usage 
of their existing appliances. 
  While the theoretical model developed in this early literature are useful in evaluating 
the demand for new technologies and estimating household discount rates, researchers find it 
challenging to obtain appropriate data for empirical estimation. New technology alternatives 
are not available in data on past appliance choices and collection of data on choices in the 
distant past often involves substantial recall issues. Further, government and utility energy-
conservation induced programs, such as rebate or low interest loans are often too small to 
induce much change in choice behaviour and/or exhibit too little variation in the levels of 
rebate or interest rate available. 
  Stated preference survey data has proven a successful alternative in several studies. 
Revelt and Train (1998) estimate the impact of rebates and loans on residential customers' 
choice of efficiency level for refrigerators using data from a southern California company. 
They find that on average, the consumers are willing to pay $2.46 for a dollar savings 
annually. This translates into a discount rate of 39 percent which is relatively high. They also 
find that responses to incentive variables are very heterogeneous. Brownstone, Bunch and 
Train (2000) collect both stated preference and actual purchase data to forecast demand for 
automobiles for California households. New technology alternatives such as electric cars or 
methanol cars are included in their stated preference survey. 
Australian studies which attempt to understand a household's decision to purchase 
water heaters and other durable appliances at the micro level are rather limited.
6 Fiebig and 
Woodland (1994) model household water heater choice as a function of household 
characteristics using a 1989 NSW survey of appliance holding and energy. They find that 
these choices are very significantly different between households with and without access to 
gas. High income households with gas access are more likely to have a gas water heater while 
high income households with no gas access are more likely to own an off-peak electric 
heater. Also, by comparing the penetration rate with the two earlier surveys, they report that 
there was very little change in the penetration rate between 1984 and 1986. In contrast, from 
                                                 
6 In New Zealand, Gillingham (2009) considers the effect of possible solar hot water rebate policy options. His 
approach is based on aggregate sales data of solar hot water systems over time. Under the assumption that 
different types of consumers would adopt solar heaters at different points of time, and that prices of solar heaters 
decline over time, he predicts that with a policy rebate starting at $1500 (and falling slightly over time), sales of 
solar hot water heaters would increase to about 25,000 systems by the next 5 years (about 80% of 2007 sales). 
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1986 to 1989 there was a modest increase in the penetration rate for off-peak electric water 
heaters and a more substantial increase in the range for gas water heaters. Bartels, Fiebig, and 
van Soest (2006) model household purchase decisions of water heaters by collecting stated 
preference data from a sample of Sydney residents in 1999. The study focused on the 
relationship between plumber recommendations and consumer choices and looked at electric 
versus gas systems for households with gas access.  
  
III. Background of New South Wales water heater market 
  In NSW, electric hot water systems were originally installed in most homes. 
However, there has been a clear trend of moving away from peak electricity to off-peak 
electricity and gas systems since the 1980s (see, e.g., Fiebig and Woodland, 1994). Table 1 
shows the distribution of water heater holdings by NSW households using data collected by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) between 1999 and 2008. There is a continuing 
trend of a decline in peak electricity in favor of off-peak and gas. Shares of solar heaters 
remained very low between 1999 and 2005 but substantially increased to 5% in 2008.  
Instantaneous gas and heat pump systems were rare in the past (hence, often not listed 
as separate categories) but recently have started to become more widely installed. The 
Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (2008) projects that 
for new homes built between 2006 and 2020, share of gas systems will be 70% and that 
instantaneous gas would be more popular than storage gas. Shares of solar and heat pump 
systems are predicted to increase to 15% and 5%, respectively (see Table 2.) 
One explanation of the gradual shift from electricity to gas in the 1980s and 1990s is 
the expansion of gas coverage in NSW over time. More recent government efforts to 
encourage households to switch from electric systems to a more climate-friendly hot water 
system potentially account for the reported 2008 figure as well as the government’s projected 
increases in shares of nonelectric systems. The Australia Federal government, NSW 
government, as well as local governments, recently established various financial incentives 
and regulations to promote energy efficiency. 
Since 2001 households who installed a solar or heat pump water heater to replace an 
electric water heater could qualify for Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs). The RECs can 
be sold in its market, which gives the owner back approximately AUD 1000.
7  This program 
                                                 
7 RECs are electronic certificates that represent blocks of energy generated from renewable sources, created 
through the Commonwealth Renewable Energy Act 2000 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the use of 
electricity. The RECs demand is generated by the regulation requirements that electricity retailers and other   7
covers the entire period that we examine so it can be thought of as the baseline rebate level. 
There is also a new building requirement called the Building Sustainability Index (BASIX) 
that is not directly relevant here, as we are looking at water heater replacement.
8  
The major change in the rebate program came with a set of large financial incentives. 
First, the Australian Government Solar Rebate  program started in July, 2007, where low 
income families who replace an electric hot water system with a solar or a heat pump system 
would receive a rebate for AUD 1000.
9 Second, and to much greater publicity, the NSW 
government initiated a rebate program in October, 2007 which was originally announced to 
end at June 30, 2009 but was later extended by two years to June, 2011. Eligible criteria for 
the NSW program were much less restricted and could be combined with the Federal 
government rebate.
10 Households who replace their electric systems with a heat pump or solar 
system receive a rebate between AUD 600 and 1200. Those who replace their electric 
systems with a gas system also receive AUD 300.
11 Starting in October 2007, households 
could potentially combine rebates from REC, Federal and NSW governments to cover a large 
part of the upfront cost. In February 2009, the Federal program stopped means testing and 
increased the amount of its solar and heat pump rebate to AUD 1600. The amount of rebate 
was dropped back to AUD 1000 in September 2009.
12 There were also some additional rebate 
programs introduced by some of the smaller NSW municipalities after the NSW rebate 
program was announced. Because it is effectively impossible to sort the effects of all of these 
                                                                                                                                                        
wholesale purchasers must surrender a number of RECs each year based on a percentage of their annual 
electricity acquisition or pay a shortfall charge ($40 per REC). REC’s supply can be created by a variety of 
renewable energy sources (e.g. wind, hydro, crop waste). Solar or heat pump water heaters that meet specified 
conditions that can be recognized for the electricity generation they displace. The owners of the heaters can 
create RECs themselves through the internet based REC registry but most find it more convenient to assign their 
right to a registered agent (most suppliers) in return for a financial benefit such as a price reduction or cash 
rebate. RECs assigned to each water heater range from 10 to 64 certificates. The REC price varies over time but 
is normally around $30-$35. 
8The BASIX program started in 2004 and required new homes to meet a BASIX score calculated on the unit’s 
water and energy usage. Households have a range of options to make their home “sustainable” in meeting the 
required BASIX score. These options include installing a gas or solar hot water system, as well as installing 
home insulation or using dual-flush toilets.  
9 The number of available rebates is limited at 225,000 households and its eligible criteria include: (1) owners or 
tenants (with owner permission), (2) solar or heat pump systems must have at least 20 RECs with a 5-year 
warranty, (3) taxable family income less than $100,000 (from the latest lodged), and (4) the dwelling must be 
the principal place of residence.  
10 Water heaters installed to comply with BASIX are excluded so no overlap exists with the new home program.  
11The eligibility criteria include: (1) owners, (2) 5-star rating gas, solar or heat pump systems with at least 20 
RECs, and (3) must continue ongoing operation for the first 5 years (audit).  
12 From February 2010 (which is beyond the period that our data is collected), the rebates for solar and heat 
pump are $1000 and $600, respectively.   8
different programs, we will consider their aggregate impact and take October, 2007 as their 
start date through the end of 2009, when our survey went into the field.
13 
There is clear external evidence that the NSW rebate program is being used. In 
March, 2009, Department of Environment and Climate Change NSW (2009) reported that 
21,196 households applied for rebates. Shares of solar, heat pump and gas systems are 61%, 
18% and 21%, respectively. While this positive response is promising, two important 
questions cannot be answered by this figure alone. As Garnaut (2009) and Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART, 2009), who reviewed the 
program, pointed out that it is difficult to assess the success of the program because of the 
lack of a clear counterfactual. The rebate uptake data alone does not tell us (1) whether the 
participation rate is high; and (2) whether there is a deadweight loss to society in the sense 
that households who applied for rebates would adopt the energy-efficient system anyway 
without rebates. Our analysis tries to answer these questions. 
 
IV. Data 
We collected data through a very large web-based panel belonging to a major survey 
research company. During December, 2009 and January, 2010, 9400 total invitations were 
sent to the panellists who were NSW homeowners. The respondents were first asked about 
the type of their current water heater, the age of that water heater, and whether they 
purchased that water heater for their home or if it was built-in. For those who had purchased a 
water heater, the year of purchase and other information about the system was elicited. For 
those who had not purchased a water heater since moving into their home, the respondent was 
asked to estimate the age of their hot water system. If the respondent could not do this, we 
approximated the age of the system by the year in which they moved into their dwelling. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of water heater holdings by the (estimated) age of the water 
heater from this sample. The data is consistent with the ABS survey data discussed earlier; 
the share of electric based systems is declined among newer systems in favour of gas. Within 
gas systems, instantaneous gas has gained in popularity and solar and heat pump shares have 
increased strikingly in the last 5 years.  
                                                 
13 The 2007 Federal program started three months earlier than the NSW program but was less publicized and 
initially targeted at the low income segment households which has a much higher propensity to rent. To the 
extent that there was a substantial increase in solar/heat pumps caused by the 2007 Federal program before the 
2007 NSW program went into effect, we will under-estimate the effect of the set of rebate incentives that 
differed from the original baseline 2001 Federal incentive program.   9
We design our study to consist of two components. First, we wanted to exploit the 
natural experiment created by the introduction of the rebate program to quantify the effect of 
the program on recent water heater demand. Second, we wanted to understand future water 
heater demand by targeting the views of those likely to soon be in the market. Given water 
heater durability of 10 to 20 years, those who recently replaced their water heater are unlikely 
to replace their system again in the next couple of years. 
Respondents who purchased the system in 2004 or afterward (subsample of the last 
column) were asked questions related to their recent purchase. We call this group the 
revealed preference (RP) respondents. Respondents with an old hot water system (the left 
column) and likely to be in the market in the near future, were further assigned to answer a 
choice experiment survey. This group is called stated preference (SP) respondents. 
The figures reported in all previous tables are aggregated over those with and without 
gas access. Previous studies suggest that to understand the decision at the household level, it 
is crucial to analyse these two groups separately, as they face different choice sets. The 
numbers of observations differentiated by gas access are provided in Table 4.
14 RP 
respondents who installed the water heaters in brand new homes are excluded from the 
analysis as choice of which type of water heater may have been made by the builder rather 
than the eventual owner in this case. The top panel shows distribution of old systems (which 
are the system previously owned by RP respondents and the current system owned by SP 
respondents.) For both RP and SP respondents, those with gas access are less likely to own an 
electric system. And for both groups, not surprisingly, those without gas access are likely to 
own an electric heater. The picture looks different for new systems chosen by RP 
respondents. Shares of nonelectric systems significantly increase. In the next section, we 
investigate whether this increase can be attributed to the rebate programs.  
 
V. Evidence from a natural experiment 
  Our RP respondents are those who replaced their water heaters between 2004 and 
2009. This cut-off of six years is chosen so that we can compare the choice decision of 
                                                 
14 We also screened out owners who reside in apartments, flats/units as they are less likely to be able to install 
solar water heater or heat pumps. We further excluded a small number of households with eight or more people 
due to the presumption that their temporal demand characteristics for hot water were likely to be different from 
other households. Another screening question asked if the respondent is responsible for his/her household's 
energy bills. We include only respondents who indicated that they were “responsible” or “jointly responsible” in 
our estimation sample under the presumption that someone who is not responsible for their household's energy 
bills is not likely to be involved in decisions about purchasing a hot water system. There are only 7 observations 
of people who purchased gas (LPG) systems and met with these criteria. We decided to exclude them as well. 
   10
households who purchased the heater before and after the large incentive programs came into 
effect. Among 912 cases, 664 previously owned an electric system and 248 previously owned 
a non-electric system (mainly gas).  October, 2007, which was the effective date of NSW 
rebate program, is chosen as a cut-off for "before" and "after" policy. Most households were 
eligible for these rebates and the NSW government broadly publicized the program. It is 
important to remember, however, that as noted earlier, we are looking not at just the NSW 
program but also the sizeable new Federal rebate program. That program was implemented 
just prior to the NSW program but its later expanded eligibility criteria meant that for most 
households it that it was effectively implemented afterwards. The baseline is not a no rebate 
condition but rather the long standing Federal rebate that was implemented in 2001.    
  Ideally, we would like to compare a treatment group who had access to the NSW and 
other contemporaneous rebate plans to a control group who did not have access to the 
increased rebates. In other words, we rely on the difference-in-difference (DID) approach 
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The basic idea behind DID is that there is a need to account 
for what would likely have happened if the policy of interest had not been put in place. In 
particular, if the overall share of electric water heaters is observed to decline, is that because 
of the new rebate policies or because the purchase of  new electric water heaters had already 
started to decline before the new policies had been put in place? 
Our treatment group is clearly households who previously owned an electric system 
as they are the ones eligible for the rebates. We consider two possible control groups. The 
first is comprised of households who own nonelectric water heaters. This group is ineligible 
for a rebate for the whole period of the study. The second is formed by splitting households 
who previously own an electric system before the NSW rebate policy took place (hence, no 
one is eligible) into two time periods (2004-2005 and 2006-September 2007) and looking at 
the change in behaviors during this earlier period. This second group appears more 
appropriate for two reasons: (1) their underlying trend should be more similar to our 
treatment group; and (2) the number of observations of households with nonelectric water 
heater with no gas access is very small. Also, these two adjacent time periods are similar in 
most respects.
15  
                                                 
15 Environmental attitudes appear to be fairly stable over the time period of our analysis. NSW was controlled 
by the Labor Party during the entire time period while at the national level, the Labor Party which put more 
emphasis on climate change than the Liberal-National coalition, took power in December 2007.  Real per capita 
income grew fairly steadily over the time period with Australia experiencing somewhat less of a boom and a 
much smaller drop due to the financial crisis than most industrialized countries. To the extent consumers felt 
more financially constrained in late 2008 and 2009, we will tend to underestimate the impact of the new rebate 
programs. Electricity and natural gas prices rose consistently over the time period of our analysis but there was   11
The DID estimate for households with gas access is presented in Table 5.
16 The three 
top rows under the header "Before" indicate that before October 2007, on average the 
probability that a household would replace the old electric system with a new electric system 
is 28 percent. The probability that they would switch to gas is 69 percent. Only 3 percent 
would switch to a solar or heat pump system.  The next column under the heading “After” 
refers to the situation where rebate policies were in place. The probability of choosing solar 
or heat pump increases to 26%. That increase comes from electricity (9%) and from gas 
(14%). These differences are reported in the last column. 
  The bottom panel compares household behaviours between two periods before 
October, 2007. We can see that for this control group, share of electric water heaters has 
already been reduced by 17%. Shares of gas and solar/heat pump have increased by 13% and 
4%, respectively. 
The DID estimate takes the difference in behaviours of the treatment and control 
groups. After taking into account the time trend, the policy has no significant effect in 
reducing the probability of choosing an electric heater. The policy however does increase the 
probability of choosing a solar or heat pump system (+19%) by drawing down the fraction 
who would have chosen a gas system. 
  Table 6 is an analogue analysis for households without gas access. Comparing before 
and after October, 2007, the probability of choosing a solar or heat pump strikingly increases 
from 10% to 60%. Even after taking account of the time trend, the effect of the policy on the 
probability of choosing a solar or heat pump is large at 43% and statistically significant. 
  One factor that is likely to influence choice of water heaters is whether the 
replacement is done on an emergency/urgent basis. Households in an emergency situation 
have less time to study all available options and may (correctly) be fearful that if they replace 
their existing hot water system with a new technology like solar or a heat pump, it will take 
longer to get the new system working. It is also likely to be the case (Bartels, Fiebig and van 
Soest, 2006) that plumbers play a much larger role in the replacement decision in an 
                                                                                                                                                        
persistent claims that electricity prices might dramatically increase if Australia implemented a climate policy 
with carbon trading. Such an expectation would tend to overestimate the impact of the new rebate programs.   
16 Probability estimates and their associated standard errors are calculated by fitting a multinomial (or binary) 
logit model as a function of two time dummies and predicting relevant probabilities. The standard errors of the 
estimates of probabilities or differences in probabilities, which are the nonlinear combination of parameters, are 
calculated by using the delta method. We also try to incorporate household size, income, and expectation about 
electricity price. Only household size significantly influences solar/heat pump for the sample with gas access, 
but the likelihood ratio test rejects the need for a larger model. In this and subsequent tables standard errors are 
displayed in parentheses. The standard convention of marking significance at the .05 level with ** and the .10 
level with * is followed.   12
emergency context and that in contrast to appliance stores, are less likely to want to deal with 
paperwork involved with rebates. Tables 7 and 8 further examine whether the effect of a 
rebate policy differs between households whose replacement was done based on an 
emergency and those who replaced their system on a nonemergency basis.   
First, notice that the probability of choosing electricity is higher for the case of 
emergency compared to nonemergency (.44 vs. 0.10 for before October, 2007) and (.38 vs. 
.08 after October, 2007). The DID estimate for the effect of a rebate policy on the probability 
of choosing a solar or heat pump is significant at 24% for the nonemergency case. The effect 
for households whose replacement was done on an emergency basis is 9% but statistically 
insignificant. This might be partly due to a small number of observations. For households 
with no gas access, recall that our DID estimate of 43% is statistical significant. DID 
estimates in Table 8 for nonemergency and emergency cases are statistically significant with 
estimated effects of at 46% and 19%, respectively.  
For households with a non-electric system (almost exclusively gas), there is no 
significant changes in their behaviours between “before” and “after” policies. This group’s 
probability of choosing a new gas system was 91% during 2004-October 2007 and 95% 
during October, 2007-2009. This is not surprising given that they are unaffected by rebate 
policies.  
It is possible that the rebate programs increased the fraction of water heaters replaced 
on a nonemergency basis. Without financial incentives, most households are unlikely to 
replace their water heaters before it breaks down. This means that the replacement is likely to 
be done on an emergency/urgent basis. Rebate programs tend to either limit the number of 
available rebates or to specify particular deadlines. This creates an incentive for some 
households to replace their water heater before their old one actually breaks down. We test 
whether the fraction of nonemergency replacement of those who own electric water heaters 
increased over time. Table 9 shows that compared to 2004 the probabilities of nonemergency 
replacement only significantly increased in 2009. The fact that the NSW rebate program 
approached its original deadline and the Federal rebate program stopped means-testing in 
2009 are likely to drive this result. 
  In sum, we find that there is a significant effect the rebate policy has on the 
probability of choosing a new technology system such as solar or heat pump. However, for 
households with gas access, that increase in probability does not imply the significant 
reduction in probability of choosing electricity. Instead, the increase comes from households 
who would have chosen gas if the policy were not in place. This implies that there are some   13
residents who are likely to stay with electric heaters. Households with high discount rates 
may still choose an electric water heater because it still has a lower up-front cost than a 
climate-friendly water heater. Further, some households may make a decision not only based 
on the trade-off between upfront costs and running costs, but also because of their perception 
toward certain types of water heaters.  For example, they may feel uncertain about the 
performance of solar and heat pump systems, as they may be unfamiliar with these products, 
or, they may choose not to have a solar tank on their roof.  
  Some previous studies (e.g., Dubin, 1986) were able to use revealed preference to 
estimate discount rates because in their data they know exactly what heater model each 
household has and electricity rates were known and common to all households. In our data, 
we do not know what heater models they have, and from preliminary survey work, most 
respondents cannot recall this information. When we asked about the available options at the 
time when they made a purchase, many respondents indicated that they were unsure whether 
solar and heat pump systems were available. There are eleven retail electricity suppliers in 
NSW who often compete against each other in the same locality and offer a myriad of 
different tariff schedules. Therefore, we are unlikely to impute up-front costs, running costs 
and choice sets for each household accurately. Hence, we have chosen to estimate discount 
rate and examine the issue of preference heterogeneity using stated preference data and 
discrete choice experiments (DCE). 
  
VI. Evidence from discrete choice experiments 
  Reliable stated preference data requires that the survey is understandable and credible 
to respondents (Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000; Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The 
scenarios presented must also be plausible and choices must be relevant. The process of 
choosing a hot water system nowadays is more complicated than in the past because so many 
options are available. We present detailed information to respondents on the characteristics of 
different systems. For households with gas access, the information on different types of 
electric heaters, gas heaters, solar and heat pump was presented. For those with no gas access, 
information about gas heaters was not presented. 
For electric systems, households will also have to choose what type of tariff they want 
to operate, which often involves the installation of a special meter. The standard (Peak) tariff 
means electricity supply is available 24 hours at a single price. Off-peak “1” is the cheapest 
electricity and provides power on that meter only for limited hours (e.g., 10 pm. – 7 am.). 
Off-peak “2” connects to both continuous and off-peak electricity supply, with off-peak   14
electricity being supplied at a lower price than peak power but a higher price than off-peak 
“1” power. Tariff choice can also influence the size of the water tank the household wants to 
purchase. Off-peak “2” requires a tank with dual elements so that one element is connected to 
the peak electric supply and the other is connected to the off-peak electric supply.  If 
households choose to connect to the off-peak tariff, they are suggested to buy a larger tank as 
water is only heated at night (or mainly at night). While homeowners generally know whether 
they have current access to off-peak power, confusion between off-peak “1” versus off-peak 
“2” exists, which is not surprising since different electric suppliers have different names for 
their tariffs. We will combine these two types of off-peak tariffs into a single off-peak 
estimate when making comparison to RP based estimates.  
For gas, besides the traditional storage system, instantaneous systems are also 
available. The instantaneous gas system only heats the water required and does not use a 
storage tank (also known as flow or tankless system). Households which used a large amount 
of water are suggested to buy the ones with high flow rates. All solar systems come with a 
booster that kicks in to heat water when there is not enough sunshine. Households also face 
choices between a gas booster and an electric booster. The number of solar panels and the 
size of tank required depend on household water usage. The heat pump, the least known hot 
of the systems, heats water by extracting energy from surrounding air. It works on the same 
principle as a refrigerator or air conditioner but in reverse. This system requires some 
electricity to operate and households can choose peak/off-peak tariff.  
In order to encourage respondents to think about a plausible water heater purchase 
situation, we first asked them: “Would you consider replacing your hot water system within 
the next couple years before it breaks down?” If they selected ‘likely’, the survey then asked 
them to make choices between different water heaters as if they were purchasing the system 
now. For respondents who selected ‘unlikely’, the survey asked the respondent to put 
themselves in a non-immediate replacement “situation where your current hot water signaled 
some problems (e.g., discoloured water due to rusty tank) and the plumber has suggested you 
to buy a new one instead of fixing it.”  
The two factors that influence the relevant choice options potentially available to a 
particular household were: (1) access to a natural gas hook-up which determined whether gas 
water heaters were possible options; and (2) number of household members and their hot 
water usage pattern which determined what size water heater was relevant. Water heater 
options shown to respondents were then conditions on these two factors. 
   15
 
 
VI.A Experimental designs 
  The key attributes of water heaters are upfront costs and running costs. The main part 
of upfront costs is the cost of the tank. The appropriate tank size depends on the selected fuel 
types and water usage. For a given fuel type, it is recommended that the household installs a 
hot water system which suits their needs. For example, the NSW Department of Environment 
and Climate Change (2008) states: "To maximize emission and running cost savings, the 
system should be large enough to provide hot water to meet the household’s needs. A system 
that is too big costs more to buy and run and will generate more greenhouse gas emission."  
For the same level of usage, the appropriate tank size also varies with type of hot water 
systems. For heaters which can generate heat 24 hours a day and everyday (peak electric and 
gas), their tank sizes can be small. If heat can be generated only during particular hours or 
certain days, then large tanks are required. Larger tanks are also more expensive than smaller 
ones. Table 10 summarizes suggested size for different fuel types and water usages from 
various brochures from suppliers and governments.  
Installation is the other part of upfront cost. This cost component is generally smaller 
but tends to be quite household-specific.
17  
  Running cost is determined by the energy required, the system converting efficiency 
and fuel tariffs. More specifically, the running cost of system s for household h is given by: 
Running costs,h = (E*TempRise)*efficiencys*tariff(fuels)* water usageh  ,  
where E  is 4.187 kJ/kg K, the heat energy required to raise the temperature of one liter of 
water by 1˚C at standard temperature and pressure; and TempRise denotes the water 
temperature needed to be raised (45˚C on average). Efficiency refers to the ability of system s 
to deliver heat energy. If a system requires twice as much energy to what can be extracted, 
then the system has an efficiency of only 50%. While actual running costs are difficult to 
accurately be observed, estimates are available from several sources (e.g., Rinnai Australia 
Pyt Ltd, 2008; Wilkenfeld and Associates Pty Ltd, 2005). The available estimates largely 
differ by their assumptions of projected tariff for electric and gas and average household 
water usage.  
To construct a plausible scenario for each household, we asked respondents to self-
select themselves into three usage-level groups. They were asked whether they consider their 
                                                 
17 Typically, a plumber needs to go to the house to assess the installation difficulty before giving a cost quote.   16
household’s hot water usage as small, medium or large.
18 To determine whether a gas system 
is a possible option for a household who currently does not use gas system, we first asked if 
the household had a gas connection to their dwellings. For those who stated that they do not 
currently have a gas connection, we ask if they know whether they have a gas line on their 
street. The respondents are classified as "gas access" if their answer is affirmative to either of 
these two questions, and as "no gas access" otherwise. Essentially, respondents are assigned 
to one of 6 types of experiments: 3 usage levels x 2 gas accessibility levels (yes/no). 
For those with gas access, their choice scenario consists of seven water heater options: 
three electric options (peak, off-peak “1”, off-peak “2”), two gas options (storage and 
instantaneous), and solar and heat pump. For those with no gas access, two gas options are 
excluded from their choice sets. There are other system attributes that we could have included 
such as different types of boosters or special tariffs for solar. This was not done in order to 
keep the choice task as straightforward as possible, simply given that our interest centered on 
the role of rebate policies and estimation of household discount rates.   
For a given usage level, each option differs by their upfront costs (which is displayed 
with and without any rebate), mail-in rebate amounts and annual running costs. Because only 
the differences in attributes matter, we keep the attributes of one option (off-peak “2”) fixed 
for all scenarios. The attributes of other options can take one of the four levels. Upfront costs 
were varied in a plausible range according to type and size of hot water system in Table 10. 
The running costs were also varied to cover the range of estimates from various sources. 
Mail-in rebate is the amount of money the respondent pays at the time of purchase and later 
mails in a rebate form to receive money back, generally taking two months to process, 
mimicking the existing rebate programs. Electric systems never have a rebate. The details are 
listed in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
Although respondents with different usage levels were mapped to a different display 
of costs they face, all designs are generated from a 4^(6*3) orthogonal mains effects design. 
                                                 
18 Our survey stated that: "Typically, the amount of water usage is based on the number of people in your 
household. 
1-2 people  small water usage 
3-4 people  medium water usage 
5-7 people  large water usage 
Each classification above assumes that: Each person takes a 10 minute shower per day with a standard 
showerhead. Hot water is not used for dishwasher, washing machine, spa or pool. However, if your household 
has 4 people and also uses hot water for dishwashing and washing machine, you may need to select “large” 
water usage. Similarly, if your hot water system is connected to a pool or a spa, you may need to select "very 
large". Respondents are then asked to select the options among "small", "medium", "large" or "very large."   17
The design consists of 64 choice sets and was blocked into four blocks.
19 Each respondent 
was asked to complete 16 choice scenarios. The upfront cost before rebate is displayed as the 
sum of net upfront costs and the rebate.  
Designs are alternative-specific where all systems have their pros and cons and no 
option clearly dominate. For example, electric-peak systems are more expensive to run but 
the cost of its smaller tank makes it less expensive. Off-peak “1” is the cheapest among 
electric systems, but if the household runs out of hot water during the day they will have to 
wait until night. A gas instantaneous system is more expensive to buy than a gas storage 
system but is more compact and has a lower running cost. A heat pump system does not 
require an exterior panel like solar, but it makes a noise similar to a refrigerator. 
Respondents are given detailed information about all of the systems and shown a 
pictorial representation. The pros and cons of the attributes of water systems are briefly 
explained before respondents are asked a set of choice tasks. Figures 1 and 2 show an 
example of information presented to the respondents for the solar water heater and an 
example of a choice scenario, respectively. 
Based on our initial survey development work, one important feature of any water 
heating system was its warranty (and implicit durability). To keep this factor constant across 
all systems, respondents were told that all systems came with a 10-year warranty for parts and 
5-year warranty for labour. Respondents were further told that if a particular alternative 
provided for a rebate that they would be eligible for it.  
 
VI.B SP Model formulation 
The purchase decision of energy-using durables is typically modeled under the random utility 
framework. Each household evaluates conditional indirect utility function for each alternative 
and choose the alternative that gives the highest utility. In our application, we specify the 
conditional indirect utility of household n from water heater j in scenario t as: 
njt njt n njt n njt n jn njt U           runcost bate dmailin_re _rebate cost_after 3 2 1  
      for  n = 1,…,N; j = 1,…,J; t=1,…,16,   (1) 
where  jn denotes the alternative specific constant, representing the unobserved value 
household n places on alternative j;  } , , { 3 2 1 n n n n       are preference weights placed on out-
of-pocket expense, rebate process and running costs, respectively; and njt is the unobserved 
                                                 
19 In blocking designs into four blocks, we repeatedly randomize the profiles so that all values of attributes 
appear in each version. This avoids situations where one version consists of all low or high levels of certain 
attributes.   18
component. This specification is similar to Revelt and Train (1998) and Bartels, Fiebig and 
van Soest (2006) where the rebate amount is incorporated in the net upfront cost term. 
‘dmailin_rebate’ (dummy for rebate) only captures people’s perception about the two-month 
mail-in rebate process holding their out-of-pocket expense constant. One would expect its 
coefficient to be negative if people dislike the two-month delay. It may be positive if the 
rebate plays the same role as an "on-sale" sign. ‘runcost’ is the annual running cost for each 
heater. The ratio  n n 1 3 /   is the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) to save $1 per year. 
Given that all heaters are assumed to have the same durability of q years, this ratio can be 














 . The first term 
represents the value of a dollar saved in the first year discounted by (1+ r). The second term 
is the value of a dollar saved in the second year discounted by (1+r)
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 , and so on. 
 Let  n denote the vector of all alternative specific constants and n denote the vector 
of the unobserved components from all choices in all scenarios for person n. Let n β = (n, n) 
denote all coefficients on observed product attributes and Xnjt collect all the terms of observed 
attributes. Then, equation (1) can be rewritten as 
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Different choice models are derived from different assumptions researchers place on  n β  and 
n. The traditional (McFadden, 1974) multinomial logit model (MNL) assumes that  n β  is 
homogeneous across n and the idiosyncratic error component εnjt is i.i.d. extreme value. 
Under these assumptions, the probability in (2) has a closed form expression. While these 
assumptions facilitate estimation, they impose a very special structure on how changes in 
elements of observed product attributes can affect choice probabilities.  For instance, the IIA 
property implies that if the share of solar water heaters were predicted to be increased, the 
share of all other heaters would be predicted to drop proportionally. Also, with our panel   19
data, the basic MNL does not incorporate that the unobserved components of observations 
from the same respondents are likely to be correlated. 
In this paper, we consider several alternative models which relax the IIA assumption 
and allow for unobserved heterogeneous tastes over the observed product attributes. The 
models we consider include the two that are widely used – the latent class model (LC; see 
Kamakura and Russell, 1989) and the mixed logit model (MIXL; see McFadden and Train, 
2000) as well as two relatively new models – the new generalized multinomial logit (G-
MNL; see Fiebig, et al., 2010) and the mixture of normals logit model or “mixed mixed” 
logit (MM-MNL; see e.g., Train, 2008) model. These models specify the heterogeneity 
distribution of n differently, but all continue to assume that the idiosyncratic error 
component εnjt is i.i.d. extreme value.  
In most application, MIXL assume that  n β  is distributed as multivariate normal in the 
population, ) , ( ~   MVN βn . LC, on the other hand, assumes that there are several segments 
of consumers.  n β  differs across segments but are the same for all consumers within the 
segment. Essentially, LC assumes that the underlying distribution is discrete. This allows for 
a more flexible shape compared to normal but is often found to understate heterogeneity in 
the population (Elrod and Keane, 1995.) G-MNL extends MIXL by nesting it with the scale 
heterogeneity model (see below). MM-MNL generalizes MIXL by specifying the mixing 
distribution in MIXL to be a discrete mixture-of-multivariate normals. One can also think of 
MM-MNL as extending LC models to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity within each 
class. The different assumptions on  n β  can be summarized in Table 11.
20  
For G-MNL,    n  is a scalar, scaling the whole  n β vector up and down;  is the 
parameter that allows  n   to be scaled up by    n  (when  = 0) or  n   to vary independently 
(when  = 1). In practice,  n   is assumed to follow lognormal distribution, ln( n  ) ~ N(
2 ,  ) 
where   is normalized to one. Also, the logistic transformation used to restrict  lies in [0,1], 
i.e., we estimate  
where  
= exp()=(1+exp()). Effectively, G-MNL adds two parameters 
to MIXL,  and 
f  equals zero,  is not identified and G-MNL approaches MIXL. If  n  = 
0, then       n n  , which is what Fiebig et al. (2010) called “scale heterogeneity” model. We 
                                                 
20 While mixture-of-normals mixed logit potentially generalizes these models, some restrictions on parameters 
are often imposed in practice. This is to avoid estimating too many parameters. Fiebig, et al., (2010) also 
pointed out that another interpretation of the generalized multinomial logit model (G-MNL) is that its taste 
distribution is a continuous mixture of scaled normals. This implies that the discrete mixture-of-normals mixed 
logit generalizes G-MNL when the number of class goes to infinity.   20
consider two common specifications of mixed logit and G-MNL models. The first version 
constrains the off-diagonal elements of  to zero (the coefficients are assumed to be 
uncorrelated.) The second version estimates the full variance-covariance matrix. For the MM-
MNL model, we consider a parsimonious version with a mixture of two independent normals, 
i.e.,  s   is diagonal. The coefficients in this model, however, are correlated by being in the 
same segment. 
For MNL and latent class models, the choice probability has a closed form expression 
and the estimation is done by maximum likelihood. For the other three models, there is no 
closed form expression for their choice probabilities. The parameters are estimated by 
maximum simulated likelihood (see details in Fiebig, et al. (2010) for G-MNL model; and 
Keane and Wasi (2010) for the MM-MNL model). 
 
VI.C Choice experiment results 
Table 12 reports choice frequencies aggregating over all scenarios. The fractions that an 
electric system is a preferred choice are 10% and 23% for respondents with gas and no gas 
access, respectively. Solar is more frequently chosen than a heat pump for both groups. For 
those with gas access, instantaneous gas is seen to be preferred to storage gas. 
Tables 13 and 14 report the results of a representative set of models for respondents 
with and without gas access, respectively. We have estimated several versions of each model 
(LC with different number of classes; MIXL and G-MNL with uncorrelated and correlated 
errors) but only present a subset of the estimates of the version preferred by Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC). We also report Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Consistent 
Akaike Information Criteria (CAIC) which impose lesser and greater penalties than does BIC 
on models based on their number of parameters.
21  
The first column in Table 13 reports the estimates from the MNL model. The two cost 
variables have negative coefficients as expected. The dummy of mail-in rebate is 
insignificant.
22 The average WTP for $1 saved annually is -3.99*10/-8.62 = 4.62.
23 Assuming 
the durability of 15 years, this implies the discount rate of 20 percent. Next are the estimates 
                                                 
21 AIC = 2k-2log(L); BIC = klog(Nobs)-2log(L), CAIC = klog(Nobs+1)-2log(L) where k is the  number of 
model parameters,  L is model likelihood, and  Nobs refers to the  number of observations. 
22 This is the expected result if respondents do not view getting the rebate back in the mail as an inconvenience 
and expect little delay in getting the rebate. Some of the more flexible model present a more nuanced view of 
this attribute.  
23 To improve estimation accuracy, all variables are scaled (downward) to have similar ranges. For example, 
upfront cost was scaled downward by a factor of 10 relative to running cost, so we have to rescale results to 
account for this in calculating various statistics of interest.    21
from the LC model with six classes. LC achieves a much higher log likelihood than MNL. 
The three largest classes make up 70% of the population. The largest class places a large 
weight on upfront cost and tends to prefer gas, solar and heat pump to electric heaters. The 
second largest class has a very large negative intercept on peak electric heaters, implying that 
this class is extremely less likely to choose peak electric heaters in all scenarios. They also 
place a higher weight on running cost relative to the first class. Class 3 prefer solar or heat 
pump systems to other systems. Class 4 cares more about upfront costs rather than type of 
water heaters. Class 5 does not like peak electric and heat pump heaters. The last class which 
represents only 6% of the population has large positive intercepts for all alternatives, 
implying that they do not like the omitted water heater, which is off-peak “2” electric. 
The third model is the mixed logit model with a full variance-covariance matrix. 
Comparing to the LC model, the log likelihood is improved by a very sizeable 1477 points. 
The mean estimate of the mail-in rebate dummy is still insignificantly different from zero but 
its variance is statistically significant at .4. The variances of other variables are also large and 
statistically significant, indicating that respondents are very heterogeneous. The estimated 
covariance matrix has been omitted to conserve space but is available upon request. This 
model implies on average that WTP for $1 saved is $7.16. Next is the result from the G-MNL 
model. It adds two parameters and outperforms MIXL on all three information criteria. 
The last column reports the estimates from the MM-MNL model.
24 This model 
achieves even a better likelihood than the G-MNL model, yet uses a smaller number of 
parameters. It, therefore, dominates other models on all three of the information criteria 
measures. Additionally, there are noticeable differences between the mean estimates of the 
two segments.
25 The first segment, representing 66% of population, assigns positive weights 
on the heat pump while the second assigns negative weights. Their average WTP for $1 saved 
annually are $8.1 and $5.5, respectively, which can be converted to discount rates of 9% and 
16%, respectively. 
Table 14 reports the results of the respondents with no gas access. The pattern of 
likelihood improvement for this group is similar to the previous table. BIC also prefers the 
                                                 
24 We also try parameterizing, wns , the segment probability, as a function of usage level and current water heater 
type, but this only results in minor improvements in the model fit. 
25 The interpretation of the two classes for this model is also more intuitive than in the standard LC model. As an 
example in the LC model, class 3 and class 4 have statistically significant parameters of roughly equal in 
magnitude but of opposite signs on the mail-in-rebate attribute. In contrast, the larger of the two MN-MNL’s 
two classes has effectively a zero coefficient on the mail-in-rebate attribute while the smaller of the two classes 
has a negative and significant parameter which accords well with the economic notion of some respondents 
having financial constraints and the marketing notion that some consumers actively do not like mail-in-rebates.   22
LC model with 6 classes. G-MNL outperforms MIXL and LC, but G-MNL is again 
dominated by MM-MNL which achieves a superior fit with fewer parameters. The estimates 
of average WTP for $1 saved from running costs from MNL and mixed logit models are 
$6.45 and $8.62, respectively. It is interesting that the respondents in this group also split into 
two segments with opposite perceptions toward heat pump heaters. The estimates of average 
WTP to save for $1 annual running cost from MM-MNL’s two segments are at $9.3 and $3.1, 
respectively.   
To further examine the distribution of taste heterogeneity, we adopt what Allenby and 
Rossi (1998) call an “approximate Bayesian” approach: A model’s estimated heterogeneity 
distribution is taken as the prior, then the posterior means of the individual-specific vectors of 
preference weights are calculated conditional on each respondent’s choices. Train (2003), 
Chapter 11 provides an algorithm for making this calculation. The estimates from MM-MNL, 
the preferred model, are used in this illustration. 
We first look at the heterogeneity distribution associated with each alternative. These 
posterior distributions of the person level coefficients of each system for respondents with 
gas access are plotted in Figure 3. More than 70% of respondents assign positive weights on 
the two gas systems and the solar system. We also see a small fraction of respondents who 
extremely prefer instantaneous gas or solar. In contrast, almost all respondents (90%) assign 
negative weights on a peak electric system. For off-peak “1” and heat pump, there are people 
who both like and dislike them. While the distribution of taste for off-peak “1” is quite 
symmetric with mass around zero, the distribution of taste for the heat pump is a multi-modal 
with a substantive mass on the positive and negative sides. 
Figure 4 plots similar distributions for respondents with no gas access. Over 80% of 
respondents like solar and dislike peak electricity. Similar to the former group, there are 
people who like and dislike the heat pump but the distribution is more dispersed on both sides 
of the support. The posterior distributions of individual-specific WTP to save $1 annually are 
plotted in Figure 5. The distributions for both groups show that respondents are very 
heterogeneous. The substantial mass lies between $4 and $10. For both groups, there are a 
small fraction with very high WTP and a small fraction with negative WTP. These should not 
be interpreted as features as the true WTP. Rather these features are likely to be generated by 
group of respondents who have very strong preferences in favor of solar or the heat pump. 
These respondents almost always choose solar or the heat pump in the given the (fairly 
narrow) range of upfront costs used in our survey.    23
We can convert each person’s estimated WTP to an implied discount rate. These 
estimates are presented in Table 15. The median discount rates for those with and without gas 
access are 12% and 10%, respectively.  
 
VII. Prediction 
  In this section, we use the estimates from MM-MNL to forecast demand for water 
heaters across different scenarios. Table 16 shows the baseline configuration assuming no 
rebate in place. These values are chosen based on what is likely to be in the market during 
2007-2009. Table 17 compares the forecast shares from SP data using these profiles to shares 
from RP data when there was no rebate. We examine three groups of respondents separately: 
(1) those who previously owned an electric system, with gas access; (2) those who previously 
owned an electric system, with no gas access; and (3) those who previously owned a 
nonelectric system, with gas access. The results of the first two groups are reported at the top 
panel and the result of the last group is reported at the bottom panel. 
  For RP data, the ‘no rebate’ situation for those who previously owned an electric 
system only refers to those who replaced their heater during the 2004-September 2007 period. 
All respondents who previously owned a nonelectric system are in a ‘no rebate’ situation. We 
report RP shares based on all observations and nonemergency cases. While conditions on 
nonemergency replacement should be more comparable with SP data, it significantly reduces 
the number of observations. For respondents who previously owned an electric water heater 
with gas access, both RP and SP data indicate that they are most likely to choose a gas water 
heater. The predicted share from SP data, however, is smaller than that of RP data. It is offset 
by the larger predicted share for solar and the heat pump.  For respondents who previously 
owned an electric heater but do not have gas access, the shares of solar and heat pump are 
slightly higher in SP than in RP data. For those who previously owned a nonelectric heater, 
the predicted shares from SP data are very close to RP data, especially if we compare SP to 
nonemergency RP. 
  Overall, the predictions from SP data seem reasonable. Several factors could account 
for the divergences that are observed in the first two groups. First, the ‘no rebate’ scenario of 
RP comes from the earlier period when some respondents may have been unaware of the 
availability of solar/heat pump systems. Information conveyed about systems by stores and 
plumbers may not match our descriptions, designed to be an unbiased presentation of the 
relevant tradeoffs. Further, running cost may have been perceived (and may actually be) 
different than those we use in making the comparison calculations with the model based on   24
the SP data. Finally, our DID estimates may not adequately control for all of the differences 
between pre and post NSW rebate periods. 
  Table 18 reports predictions from different rebate scenarios. The shares under the 
“baseline” column are from Table 17. In the first scenario, we assume that the gas system is 
eligible for the $300 rebate and the rebate covers 50% of the upfront cost of solar and heat 
pump systems. This situation mimics the NSW and Federal programs in effect during the 
period that our data was collected. For those who previously owned an electric system with 
gas access, shares of both types of gas systems are declined. Shares of solar and heat pump 
altogether are increased by 20%. For respondents with no gas access, the shares of solar and 
heat pump are added up to reflect a 38% increase. This prediction is quite similar to the DID 
estimate from the natural experiment where we found that the rebate program increased the 
share of solar and heat pumps conditional on nonemergency replacement by 24% for gas 
access households and 46% for no gas access households. 
  In the second scenario, we assume the lower amount of rebates for solar and heat 
pumps to cover only 25% of upfront costs while the rebate for gas remains the same at $300. 
This situation is similar to the new rebate program that NSW put into effect starting in early 
2010 where all systems are only eligible for a $300 rebate with household still eligible for 
Federal rebates for solar and heat pump systems. Our model predicts that the share of gas 
would remain approximately the same in this case. Shares of solar/heat pump would increase 
by 4% and 16% for respondents with and without gas access.  In the last scenario, we assume 
that the amount of rebates for solar and heat pumps covers only 10% of their upfront costs. 
This would be the case if NSW gives $300 for gas, solar and heat pumps and the Federal 
government stopped its rebate program. In this situation, the share of gas is predicted to rise 
more than that of solar/heat pump (4% vs. 1%). For households with no gas access, the shares 
of solar and heat pumps are predicted to increase by only 3% each. This implies that if the 
amount of the rebate is too low that there would be only a small overall shift toward solar and 
heat pump water heating systems. 
  The bottom panel are predictions for respondents who currently own a non-electric 
system. This group is ineligible for the existing NSW and Federal rebate programs. As noted 
earlier from RP data, most of these respondents had a gas system and replaced it with a gas 
system. An interesting question here is what would have happened if NSW were to 
implement programs like some other Australian states (e.g., South Australia, Victoria, and 
Western Australia) where eligibility for a rebate does not require replacing an existing 
electric system? This change in eligibility could help shift those with gas water heaters   25
toward purchasing solar or heat pumps. We can use our SP data to make this prediction about 
the impact of such policies with such a change in eligibility. The two rebate scenarios we 
consider are similar to those described earlier except that now we assume that there is no 
rebate for gas. For the first (high rebate) scenario, the shares of solar and heat pump are 
predicted to increase by 13% and 7%, respectively. In the second scenario, the increase of 
solar and heat pump share together is only 4%. In the lowest rebate scenario, the program 
almost has no effect on water heater demand, only increasing the share of solar by 1%.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
  In the past decade the Australian Federal government and state governments have 
established a wide range of financial incentives and regulations to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions from all sectors. This paper has focused on the hot water system, one of the major 
sources of carbon emissions, and the role of increasing rebates in shifting the existing stock 
of electric water heaters toward more climate friendly versions. Surprisingly, there is very 
little work that looks at the effectiveness of such programs.  
We took a two pronged approach. The first was to look at recently installed water 
heaters using a difference-in-difference approach. Results here suggest that the NSW and 
other (e.g., later Federal) rebates were successful at increasing the rate of switching from 
electric water heaters relative to the long existing baseline Federal rebate program. For 
households without access to natural gas, there is a clean switch to solar and heat pump 
systems, although the observed market share of such systems overstates the effectiveness of 
the new rebate programs because there was already a shift taking place toward such systems. 
For households with access to natural gas, there is a clear shift toward solar and heat pumps 
but most of these households would have installed a gas water heater rather than replaced 
their existing electric water heaters with another electric water heater. We also find evidence 
that water heater purchases under emergency situations are not nearly as responsive to the 
new rebate programs as water heater purchased under nonemergency situations. This suggests 
improving the information set available to households who make purchases in emergency 
situations. Previous work (Bartels, Fiebig and van Soest, 2006) points to plumbers being one 
of the key sources of consumer information in this situation.  
Our model built on a discrete choice experiment using SP data points to considerable 
heterogeneity preferences toward different types of water heaters. Our results suggest 
considerable heterogeneity in the household discount rates which characterize the trade-off 
between upfront cost and the payback period related to a particular water heater, with more   26
flexible models tending to indicate lower discount rates on average than the workhorse MNL 
model. Results from our discrete choice experiments using stated preference data also help 
isolate the effects of different rebate policies which are predicted to have sizeable effects on 
non-electric water heater uptake. When rebate levels are set similar to those experienced in 
the post-October, 2007 period, our SP model produces estimated shares similar to those 
observed in our RP data set. Our model also predicts substantial reductions in the market 
share of solar and heat pump systems installed, if rebate levels are substantially reduced 
toward their earlier baseline level. In addition, we predict that making households currently 
owning a gas system eligible for rebates if they install solar or heat pump systems would 
increase share of these two systems from this group who currently have gas systems by 20%.  
Our two-pronged attack of using a DID approach with data from relatively recent 
appliance purchases taken after a major rebate program has been put in place and using a 
discrete choice experiment approach with stated preference data to look at a broader set of 
rebate options is likely to be useful in a wide array of contexts. A natural next step is to 
extend the analysis to other Australian states which implemented an array of different hot 
water system rebate programs over this time period. Combining the data and analyses across 
states would allow one to draw stronger and more comprehensive conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the rebate programs undertaken. Our approach could also be used to look at 
other appliance programs aimed at energy conservation involving refrigerators, space heaters 
and washer/dryers, as well as programs aimed at decreasing residential water use through the 
replacement of indoor plumbing fixtures or the conversion of outdoor landscaping.    27
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Figure 1: Example of information presented to respondents for solar water heater 
 
 
   30
Figure 2: Example of choice scenario 
 
 Electric  Electric  Electric  Gas  Gas  Solar  Heat  Pump 
  Off-peak 2  peak  Off peak 1  Storage  Instantaneous     




1500 1100 1500 1500  2100 4500  3300 
 
Amount of mail-in rebate 
 




1500 1100 1500 1500  1800 4500  2500 
              
Annual running costs  
($/year)  500 800 425 325  275 130  160 
              
 
Which heater is your most 
Preferred option? 
 
□  □  □  □  □  □  □ 
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Figure 3: Posterior distribution of individual-level coefficient for respondents with gas access 
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Figure 4: Posterior distribution of individual-level coefficient for respondents with no gas access 
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Figure 5: Posterior distribution of individual-level Willingness to Pay to save $1 on running cost annually 
 
 





willingness to pay for $1 saved in running cost/year: Gas access
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Table 1: Distribution of water heater by types in NSW households 
 
NSW 1999  2002  2005  2008 
Peak electricity  75.9  33.1 17.3 10.9 
Off-peak electricity  45.9  46.5  47.1 
Mains gas   20.8  23.4  25.2  25.5 
Solar 2.7  2.4  1  5 
Other 0.9  0.5  0.6  0.3 
Did not know  0.8  2.2  8.6  12.1 








Mains gas storage  30% 
Mains gas instantaneous  45% 
Solar 15% 
Heat pump  5% 
LPG   2% 
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Table 3: Current hot water system holding from panel survey 
 
   Estimate age of the hot water system 
   10 or more years  6-9 years  5 years or less 
   (1999 or earlier)  (2000-2003)  (2004 or later) 
   Freq  %  Freq  %  Freq  % 
Peak electricity  172  18.6  172  19.9  222  14.5 
Off-peak electricity  363  39.2  305  35.3  407  26.5 
   Off-peak 1   212  22.9  162  18.8  231  15.1 
   Off-peak 2   151  16.3  143  16.6  176  11.5 
Mains gas storage  246  26.6  209  24.2  269  17.5 
Mains gas instantaneous  83  9.0  123  14.3  310  20.2 
Solar 46  5.0  39  4.5  190  12.4 
Heat pump  2  0.2  2  0.2  108  7.0 
LPG 13  1.4  13  1.5  28  1.8 
                  




Table 4: Distribution of electric and nonelectric water heaters from RP and SP 
respondents 
  
   RP respondents  SP respondents 
   Gas access  No gas access  Gas access  No gas access 
Old system           
Electric system  192  472 207 321
Nonelectric system  216  32  340  33 
New system            
Electric system  55  295
Nonelectric system  353  209       
             
Total 408  504  547  354 
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Table 5: DID estimate from revealed preference data for household with gas access 
 
   Before After  Time  difference 
Previous type = electric (treatment)  2004-2007 2007-2009     
prob (elec)  0.28  0.19  -0.09 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
prob (gas)  0.69  0.55  -0.14 
   (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.03  0.26  0.23 
   (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
           
Previous type = electric in early years (control)  2004-2005 2006-2007     
prob (elec)  0.39  0.22  -0.17 
   (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
prob (gas)  0.61  0.74  0.13 
   (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.00  0.04  0.04 
      (0.02)  (0.02) 
Effects of policy on       DID 
prob (elec)       0.08 
   (0.10)
prob (gas)       -0.27** 
   (0.11)
prob (solar/heat pump)       0.19** 
         (0.06) 
 
Table 6: DID estimate from revealed preference data for household with no gas access 
 
   Before After  Time  difference 
Previous type = electric (treatment)  2004-2007 2007-2009     
prob (elec)  0.90  0.40  -0.50 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.10  0.60  0.50 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
           
Previous type = electric in early years (control)  2004-2005 2006-2007   
prob (elec)  0.94  0.87  -0.07 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.06  0.13  0.07 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Effects of policy on        DID 
prob (elec)       -0.43** 
        (0.06) 
prob (solar/heat pump)       0.43** 
         (0.06) 
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Table 7: DID estimates separating emergency and nonemergency for households with gas 
access 
 
 Households with gas access  Nonemergency Emergency 
   Before After 
Time 
difference Before After 
Time 
difference 









2009    
prob  (elec)  0.10 0.08  -0.01  0.44 0.38  -0.06 
    (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.11) 
prob  (gas)  0.87 0.59  -0.27  0.55 0.48  -0.07 
    (0.05)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.11) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.04  0.33  0.29  0.02  0.14  0.12 
    (0.03)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.07) 
                    









2007    
prob  (elec)  0.15 0.08  -0.08  0.52 0.37  -0.14 
    (0.10)  (0.04) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.13) 
prob  (gas)  0.85 0.87  0.03  0.48 0.59  0.11 
    (0.10)  (0.05) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.13) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.03 
      (0.04)  (0.04)     (0.03)  (0.03) 
Effects of policy on      DID      DID 
prob (elec)       0.06       0.09 
   (0.11)    (0.17)
prob (gas)       -0.30**       -0.18 
   (0.14)    (0.17)
prob (solar/heat pump)       0.24**       0.09 
         (0.09)        (0.08) 
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Table 8: DID estimates separating emergency and nonemergency for households with no gas 
access 
 
 No gas access  Nonemergency  Emergency 
   Before After 
Time 
difference Before  After 
Time 
difference 









2009    
prob (elec)  0.74  0.15  -0.59  0.94  0.68  -0.26 
   (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.26  0.85 0.59  0.06  0.32 0.26 
   (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.08) (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
                    









2007    
prob (elec)  0.80  0.67  -0.13  0.98  0.91  -0.07 
   (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.14) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
prob (solar/heat pump)  0.20  0.33 0.13  0.02  0.09 0.07 
   (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.14) (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Effects of policy on        DID        DID 
prob (elec)  -0.46**    -0.19**
        (0.17)       (0.06) 
prob (solar/heat pump)       0.46**       0.19** 
         (0.17)        (0.06) 
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Table 9: The estimates of the increase in probability of nonemergency replacement 
 
   Estimates of the difference in     
year  prob. of nonemergency replacement  s.e. 
   compared to 2004    
2005 -0.09  0.07 
2006 -0.09  0.07 
2007 q1,q2,q3  -0.11  0.06 
2007 q4,2008 q1,q2  -0.06  0.07 
2008 q3,q4  -0.06  0.07 
2009 q1,q2  0.20**  0.07 
2009 q3, q4  0.30**  0.07 




Table 10: Suggested sizes of water heaters for different water usage level 
 
Suggested tank size/flow rate  Small usage  Medium usage  Large usage 
Electric (storage – peak)  50-80 L  125,160 L  250,315 L 
Electric (storage – off-peak 1,2)  160-250 L  250, 315 L  315,400 L 
Gas (instantaneous)  16-20 L/min  20,24,26 L/min  26,32 L/min 
Gas (storage )  90-130 L  135,160 L  160, 200 L 
Solar 180-300  L 
+ 1 panel 
300-370 L 
 + 2 panels 
400-440 L 
 + 3 panels 
Heat pump  160-250 L  270-310 L  300-340 
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Table 11: Summary of model assumption on distribution of taste heterogeneity 
 
MNL  n βn          
Latent class 
  s n β    with probability  s n w ,  
                where  1 ,  
s
s n w  and s w s n     0 ,    
Mixed logit 
) , ( ~  β MVN βn ; or  
n n                                           where ) , 0 ( ~  MVN n     
G-MNL  n n n n n        ) 1 (               where ) , 0 ( ~  MVN n    
MM-MNL 
) , ( ~ s s n β MVN β   with probability  s n w ,  
                where  1 ,  
s
s n w  and s w s n     0 ,    
 
 
 Table 12: Choice frequency from stated experiment data 
 
   Gas access  No gas access 
   Freq.  % Freq.  % 
              
Electric - peak  215  2  152  3 
Electric - off-peak         
   off-peak 1  514  6  830  15 
   off-peak 2  214  2  275  5 
Gas - storage  1353  15      
Gas - instant  1808  21      
Solar 3071  35 2732  48 
Heat pump  1577  18 1675  30 
              
No of scenarios  8752     5664    
No of respondents  547     354    
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Table 13: Selected results for respondents with gas access 
   MNL     Latent class        MIXL     G-MNL     Mixture-of-normals 
(correlated) (correlated) (2 indep.normals)
      class 1  class 2  class 3  class 4  class 5  class 6        class 1  class 2 
Mean 
(omitted electric off-peak2) 
Electric peak  0.44**  -0.44  -30  2.14  0.81**  -30  12.52  -2.81**  1.12**  -1.13**  -1.35** 
(0.10) (0.40) -  (1.62)  (0.09) -  - (0.28)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.28) 
Electric off-peak 1  0.41**  0.92**  -0.15  0.41  1.12**  -2.53**  10.94  -0.54**  1.7**  -0.02  -1.07** 
(0.08) (0.20)  (0.14)  (1.09)  (0.06)  (0.18) -  (0.14)  (0.30) (0.21)  (0.18) 
Gas  storage  1.38**  3.21**  0.1  -0.1  0.54** -1.54** 13.82  1.83**  5.64**  1.69**  0.9** 
(0.08) (0.19)  (0.16)  (1.27)  (0.11)  (0.14) -  (0.18)  (0.31) (0.16)  (0.28) 
Gas instantaneous  1.73**  2.59**  1.35**  -0.01  0.004  -0.26*  16.06  2.26**  6.59**  2.26**  1.03** 
(0.08) (0.21)  (0.15)  (1.27)  (0.16)  (0.16) -  (0.20)  (0.34) (0.17)  (0.31) 
Solar  2.5**  2.86** 2.01**  3.91** 0.9**  0.26  11.81  3.12**  7.25**  2.76** 1.23** 
(0.10) (0.22)  (0.19)  (1.25)  (0.16)  (0.21) -  (0.23)  (0.36) (0.19)  (0.37) 
Heat pump  1.69**  1.89**  2.21**  2.64**  -0.18  -4.73**  12.66  1.3**  5.32**  1.56**  -1.71** 
(0.10) (0.22)  (0.20)  (1.25) (0.19)  (0.44) (0.00)  (0.24) (0.34)  (0.20)  (0.34) 
Cost-after-rebate/10000 -8.62** -18.96** -17.03** -5.73** -13.92** -11.38** -7.74**  -22.81** -26.57**  -27.3** -16.93** 
(0.18) (0.50)  (0.44)  (0.36) (0.55)  (0.56) (1.11)  (0.59) (1.02)  (0.80)  (1.01) 
1 if mail-in rebate dummy  0.002  -0.06  0.25**  -0.003  -0.29**  0.06  -0.03  -0.04  0.03  0.01  -0.28* 
(0.03) (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.16)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.16) 
Annual  running  cost/1000  -3.99**  -5.69** -13.12** -7.5**  -1.77** -11.29**  -7.07**  -16.33**  -17.94**  -22.02** -9.35** 
(0.20) (0.34)  (0.54)  (0.88) (0.32)  (0.66) (1.46)  (0.57) (0.72)  (0.76)  (0.74) 
Covariance  No no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
class prob.  0.34**  0.21**  0.15**  0.14**  0.09**  0.06**  0.66  0.34 
(0.03) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
 0.57** 
(0.02) 
*  0.03 
(0.13) 
No. of parameters  9     59                    54     56     37    
Loglikelihood  -12861     -8924                    -7447     -7198     -7142    
AIC 25740  17967  14933 14508  14359 
BIC 25804  18384  15075 14904  14620 
CAIC 25813      18443                    15095     14960     14657      42
Table 14: Selected results for respondents with no gas access 
 
   MNL     Latent class     MIXL     G-MNL     Mixture-of-normals 
(correlated) (correlated)  (2 indep. Normals) 
      class 1  class 2  class 3  class 4  class 5  class 6        class 1  class 2 
Mean 
(omitted electric off-peak2) 
Electric peak  -0.04  0.86  0.13  16.08  0.7**  -0.41  -2.58**  -0.7**  0.03  -1.84**  -1.63** 
(0.11) (0.55)  (0.31)  -  (0.16) (0.41)  (0.59)  (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.68)  (0.35) 
Electric off-peak 1  0.61**  -1.77**  1.65**  16.57  1.57**  0.03  -4.23**  0.16  0.55*  0.62*  0.31 
(0.08) (0.73)  (0.21)  -  (0.11) (0.22)  (0.49)  (0.21) (0.29)  (0.33)  (0.23) 
Solar  1.84**  1.88** 2.4** 21.27  1.28**  0.24 -5.03**  2.89**  3.84**  3.9** 3.33** 
(0.12) (0.48)  (0.36)  -  (0.23) (0.52)  (1.26)  (0.24)  (0.48)  (0.41)  (0.44) 
Heat pump  1.23**  1.22**  1.95**  17.63  -0.33  2.13**  -5.39**  1.8**  2.47**  3.1**  -1.21** 
(0.12) (0.48)  (0.36)  -  (0.33) (0.43)  (1.02)  (0.23)  (0.44)  (0.40)  (0.52) 
Cost-after-rebate/10000 -7.13** -16.21** -23.23** -5.99** -12.9** -4.65** -15.04**  -22.43** -26.29**  -29.48** -15.86** 
(0.21) (0.71)  (0.93)  (1.09) (0.62) (0.67)  (1.10)  (1.04) (1.40)  (1.45)  (1.22) 
1 if mail-in rebate  0.05  0.19  -0.14  0.26  -0.18  0.32  0.77  -0.06  -0.06  -0.05  0.34 
(0.05) (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.23) (0.20) (0.26)  (1.00)  (0.11) (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.22) 
Annual  running  cost/1000  -4.6**  -21.68** -10.95**  -1.19  -2.81** -3.87** -13.52**  -19.35**  -23.31**  -27.45**  -4.96** 
(0.29) (1.36)  (1.01)  (1.94) (0.58) (1.03)  (1.74)  (0.88) (1.31)  (1.80)  (0.94) 
Covariance  no no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
class prob.  0.33**  0.20**  0.18**  0.13**  0.12**  0.04**  0.58**  0.42** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
 0.4** 
(0.04) 
*  -5 
(8.01) 
No. of parameters  7     47                    35     37     29 
Loglikelihood  -6250     -3937                    -3511     -3478     -3441    
AIC 12514  7967  7092  7029  6941 
BIC 12560  8279  7325  7275  7133 
CAIC  12567     8326                    7360     7312     7162    
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Table 15: Distribution of estimated discount rates 
 
Discount rates  Gas access No gas access
   Freq (%)  Freq (%) 
        
Less than 2%  22  26 
2-10% 22  23 
10-20% 24  18 
20-40% 16 10






        
Median discount rate  12%  10% 
        
 
 
Table 16: Baseline configuration 
 
      Small  Medium Large













Electric                
    Peak  900  350 1100 600 1400 875 
   Off peak 1  1200  180 1500 325 1800  450
   Off peak 2  1200  300  1500  500  1800  750 
Gas      
    Storage  1200 180 1500 325 1800 450 
    Instantaneous  1600 140 2000 225 2400 300 
Solar/Heat  pump                
    Solar  4500 130 5500 210 6500 320 
   Heat pump  4000  130  5000  210  6000  320 
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Table 17: Prediction with no rebate 
A. Previously own electric system  Gas Access    No gas access 
Choices share from  Predicted shares  Choices share from  Predicted shares 
RP data ("before policy") SP data  RP data ("before policy") SP data 
      All  Nonemergency       All  Nonemergency    
Electric 
Peak 0.10 0.08  0.05  0.23  0.13  0.06 
Off peak  0.19 0.02  0.22  0.68  0.61  0.62 
Gas 
Storage 0.15 0.12  0.18 
Instantaneous 0.54 0.75  0.44 
Solar/Heat pump 
Solar 0.03 0.04  0.09  0.08  0.18  0.20 
Heat pump  0.00 0.00  0.03  0.02  0.08  0.12 
No of obs.  114 52  189  38 
                          
B. Previously own nonelectric system Gas Access 
Choices share from  Predicted shares 
RP data ("before policy") SP data 
      All  Nonemergency    
Electric 
Peak 0.01 0.00  0.02 
Off peak  0.03 0.04  0.06 
Gas 
Storage 0.55 0.34  0.30 
Instantaneous 0.38 0.55  0.50 
Solar/Heat pump 
Solar 0.04 0.07  0.09 
Heat pump  0.00 0.01  0.02 
No of obs.  216 71 
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Table 18: Counterfactual policy experiment from SP data 
A. Previously own electric system                      
Gas Access  No gas access 
Rebate Baseline  Scenario  I  Scenario  II  Scenario III  Baseline  Scenario I  Scenario II  Scenario II 
gas -  $300  $300  $300  -  $300  $300  $300 
solar/heat pump  -  covering 50%   covering 25%   covering 10%   -  covering 50%   covering 25%   covering 10%  
            of upfront cost  of upfront cost  of upfront cost        of upfront cost  of upfront cost  of upfront cost 
Electric 
Peak 0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.06 
Off peak  0.22  0.14  0.17  0.17  0.62  0.26  0.47  0.58 
Gas 
Storage 0.18  0.16  0.19  0.20 
Instantaneous 0.44  0.35 0.43 0.46
Solar/Heat pump 
Solar 0.09  0.20  0.11  0.09  0.20  0.41  0.28  0.23 
Heat pump  0.03  0.12  0.05  0.04  0.12  0.29  0.20  0.15 
                                   
B. Previously own nonelectric system 
Gas Access 
Rebate Baseline  Scenario  I*  Scenario II*  Scenario III* 
gas -  -  -  - 
solar/heat pump  -  covering 50%   covering 25%   covering 10%  
            of upfront cost  of upfront cost  of upfront cost 
Electric 
Peak 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02
Off peak  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.06 
Gas 
Storage 0.30  0.25  0.29  0.30 
Instantaneous 0.50  0.38  0.47  0.50 
Solar/Heat pump 
Solar 0.09  0.22  0.12  0.10 
Heat pump  0.02  0.09  0.03  0.02 




Table A1: DCE Attributes and Levels 
 
   Net cost (after rebate)  Mail-in rebate Annual  running  costs     
   Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level4 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Small  water  usage                      
Electric  (off-peak  2)  1200         0      300       
Electric  (peak)  600 800  1000  1200 0  0  0  0  350 450 550 650 
Electric  (off-peak  1) 800  1050  1300  1550 0  0  0  0  180 220 260 280 
Gas  storage  800  1050  1300  1550 0  250 450 650 180 220 260 280 
Gas  instantaneous  1200  1465  1730  2000 0  250 450 650 140 180 220 260 
Solar  1200 2000 2800 3600  0  1500 2000 2500  70  90  110  130 
Heat  pump  1200 2000 2800 3600  0  1500 2000 2500  70  90  110  130 
                              
Medium water usage                                     
Electric  (off-peak  2)  1500         0      500       
Electric  (peak)  900  1100  1300  1500 0  0  0  0  500 650 800 950 
Electric  (off-peak  1)  1050  1350  1650  1950 0  0  0  0  325 375 425 475 
Gas  storage  1050  1350  1650  1950 0  250 450 650 325 375 425 475 
Gas  instantaneous  1500  1830  2160  2500 0  250 450 650 225 275 325 375 
Solar  1500 2500 3500 4500  0  1500 2000 2500  100  130  160  210 
Heat  pump  1500 2500 3500 4500  0  1500 2000 2500  100  130  160  210 
                              
Large water usage                                     
Electric  (off-peak  2)  1800         0      750       
Electric  (peak)  1200  1400  1600  1800  0 0 0 0  750  950  1150  1350 
Electric  (off-peak  1)  1300  1650  2000  2350 0  0  0  0  450 525 600 675 
Gas  storage  1300  1650  2000  2350 0  250 450 650 450 525 600 675 
Gas  instantaneous  1800  2200  2600  3000 0  250 450 650 300 375 450 525 
Solar  1800 3000 4200 5400  0  1500 2000 2500  200  240  280  320 
Heat  pump  1800 3000 4200 5400  0  1500 2000 2500  200  240  280  320 
                                      
 
 